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Abstract 
Towards the close of the 20th century, sensational political changes took place in Africa and in other 
Third World Countries (TWCs), which ignited widespread democratization in several nation-states 
previously under diverse forms of autocratic regimes. However, the zeal and enthusiasm with which 
these TWCs embraced democratization diminished as soon as elections were concluded, thus 
jeopardizing the sustainability of the emerging democracies. For instance, in African states, 
democratization has remained problematic. The dilemma is that there exists an articulated desire to 
democratize the polity but the spirit, commitment and political will to actualize this desire is to say the 
least, lacking. Indeed, elected and appointed political office holders at all tiers of government 
circumvent and subvert the democratization process through the deflation of the constitution and all 
known democratic norms and principles. Sadly, this allows the State to suffer, in most cases, from the 
personalization of state authority. Democratization as a process enthrones structures that were hitherto 
not in existence in the state. The strength or otherwise of any democratic governance is therefore a 
function of the extent to which actors are able to internalize democratic etiquettes and also foster 
political institutionalization. Invariably, political institutionalization can only be guaranteed when 
democratic regimes are sustained. This paper, therefore, examines the challenges of institutionalizing a 
very critical component and arm of Government in Africa (that is, the Legislature), but with particular 
emphasis on Nigeria since the return of democratic governance in 1999. The paper argues that within 
this period, the legislature faced numerous challenges which made it difficult for her institutionalize 
itself within the power matrix of the presidential system, which the country’s present democratic 
arrangement is anchored on. While identifying some of these challenges, the paper contends that except 
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political institutionalization is guaranteed, democratic regimes can hardly be sustained in Africa. The 
paper adopts a historical approach, employing descriptive, narrative and empirical tools in arriving at 
our conclusions. 
Keywords 
legislature, institution, instutionalization, democracy, democratization 
 
1. Introduction 
Towards the close of the 20th century, sensational political changes took place in Africa and in other 
Third World Countries (TWCs), which ignited widespread democratization in several nation-states 
previously under diverse forms of autocratic regimes and Nigeria was not left out. However, the zeal 
and enthusiasm with which these TWCs embraced democratization diminished as soon as elections 
were concluded. This was because most of the emerging “democrats” personified themselves over and 
above democratic institutions, thereby jeopardizing the sustainability of these emerging democracies. 
For instance, Nigeria switched from the British-type parliamentary system of government to the 
America-type presidential model in 1979, and adopted the same model in 1999, after about two 
decades of military incursion into the nation’s political space. A major high point of the return of 
democracy in 1999 was the re-introduction presidential system of government with its attendant theory 
of separation of powers and the concept of checks and balances. The reasons why the departing military 
officers adopted the presidential model over the parliamentary type has already been addressed 
elsewhere and so that should no detain us here (Note 1). Be that as it may, the preference of the military 
for the presidential system hinges on the fact that “the presidential model has clear lines of authourity 
similar to military command structure and authouritarian logic (Note 2)”.  
It should be noted that democracy generally is predicated on the establishment and existence of strong 
institutions—the executive, legislature, judiciary, police, press, anti-graft institutions and so forth—to 
drive the process. Invariably, democratization as a process enthrones structures that were hitherto not in 
existence in the state particularly during military rule. The strength or otherwise of any democratic 
governance is, therefore, a function of the extent to which actors are able to internalize democratic 
etiquettes and also foster political institutionalization. In this connection, political institutionalization 
can only be guaranteed when democratic regimes are sustained (Note 3). Unfortunately, much of Africa 
and Nigeria in particular has continued to face the challenge of strengthening democratic structures and 
institutions. For instance, the legislature is one of the most critical arms or institutions of government 
that was restored in 1999. The legislature is not just one of the critical tripods that constitute the trinity 
of democratic governance, it is also fundamentally saddled with the responsibility of lawmaking, 
representation, oversight and other quasi-judicial functions. Regrettably, by 1999 very little was known 
about this institution in Nigeria and this could be attributable to three reasons: “one, the ideological 
nature of its historical institutionalization, two, its institutional underdevelopment and basterdization by 
military praetorianism, and three, its peripheriality in the political economy of resource control and 
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distribution (Note 4)”. These factors among other salient ones have woven a complex tapestry to give 
shape and definition to the texture and tenor of the legislature in Nigeria. 
Consequently, since the re-introduction of the legislature in 1999, it has faced the challenge of 
institutionalization not just from the public but essentially from the executive branch, a development that 
has continued to create needless frictions and conflicts between the legislature and the executive. This is 
largely explainable within the context of the consummation of legislative powers by the executive during 
the long years of colonial and military rule (Note 5). Since it became the tradition of military heads of 
state to enjoy overwhelming executive and legislative powers, the Obasanjo presidency from 1999-2007, 
tried to continue with this tradition through his persistent attempts to dominate the legislature by overtly 
involving himself in the politics of who leads both chambers of the legislature (Note 6). This led to 
serious contestations power between the executive and the legislature and which presented the latter as 
the weeping child in this contest. The activities of the Obasanjo presidency diminished the legislature and 
was also a serious infraction to the institutionalization of the activities of this critical arm of government.  
This paper is therefore set to examine the factors and forces responsible for the challenges of 
instutionalization confronting the legislature in nation’s bourgeoning democracy and also propose the 
way forward. To conveniently do this, this paper is divided into five sections. After the ongoing 
introduction, section two will examine conceptual and theoretical issues and perspectives, while section 
three will trace the historical underpinnings of the challenges of political institutionalization of the 
legislature. Section four will examine the specific challenges confronting the legislative institution in 
its bid to perform its statutory functions, while section five concludes the paper. 
 
2. Theoretical Perspective 
Political institutions are critical in attaining the ends of democracy. Democracy is certainly not an end 
in itself but the beginning of an end. That is why beyond democracy, some scholars are beginning to 
pay more emphasis on democratization. Whereas, democracy places emphasis on governments 
established on the basis of people’s power (Note 7), democratization implies not just the introduction of 
new political institutions but also the empowerment of such institutions and structures to acquire 
autonomy and competence in the performance of their specified functions (Note 8). In this context, 
“democratization is a transitory, continuous and an on-going process of transformation from one system 
to another under a democratic arrangement (Note 9)”. Ayo Akinbobola is very apt in his definition of 
democratization which emphasizes institution strengthening. To him: 
Democratization as a universal dictum should be seen as a process of structural and cultural 
amelioration of the institutions of state, a means of transformation from institutional 
emasculation to a new lease on political life of structural differentiation and cultural 
secularization (Note 10). 
Arising from the above explanation, this paper adopts the theoretical perspective which hinges on the 
fact that it is the strength and stability of political institutions that determines the health of any 
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democratic system. Proponents of this perspective, Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson (Note 11), 
have argued and also demonstrated substantially in their incisive book that nations have failed because 
of the nature and character of the institutions they have developed over time. According to them: 
The political institutions of a society are key determinants of the outcome of this game. 
They are the rules that govern incentives in politics. They determine how the government is 
chosen and which part of the government has the right to do what. Political institutions 
determine who has power in the society and to what ends that power can be used. If the 
distribution of power is narrow and unconstrained, the political institutions are absolutist, 
as exemplified by the absolutist monarchies reigning throughout the world during much of 
history (Note 12).  
The point being made here is that political and economic institutions can be inclusive and encourage 
political and economic development, or they can be extractive and become impediments to political 
and economic development. Nations fail when they develop extractive political and economic 
institutions that impede and even block economic growth and political development. Most nations in 
Africa today have failed because—on purpose—they have deliberately developed extractive and weak 
political institutions like the legislature at the detriment of inclusive institution that would serve as the 
spring board of development. The central argument here is that the choice of institution is central to our 
quest for understanding the reasons for the success or failure of nations. 
 
3. Historical Perspective on the Development of a Weak Legislative Institution in Nigeria 
One of the hallmarks of any democracy is the extent to which the institutions of government are freely 
able to exercise their statutory constitutional powers. Under the Presidential system of government 
adopted by Nigeria in the Second and Fourth Republics, the powers of each branch of government are 
separate and clearly defined, and each branch is expected to operate within its sphere. This strengthens 
institutions and also ensures effective functioning of government. History is however replete with a 
long period of emasculation of the legislature, which has posed series of challenges to this bourgeoning 
institution in contemporary times. 
The history of the legislature in Nigeria is actually very chequered. From the onset when what appeared 
to be a semblance of a Legislative Council was introduced in 1862 in Lagos under the British Crown 
Colony administration, it was basically aimed at furthering, not the interest of the people it was 
introduced for but that of the crown colony administration (Note 13). The subsequent colonization of 
Nigeria and the establishment of various Legislative Councils from 1914 to 1960 appeared to be mere 
window dressing, as these councils were clothed with no legislative powers at all. From the Clifford to 
the Lytletton Constitutions, the legislature served essentially in advisory capacity. The Governor 
General was clothe with enormous power that the establishment of the Legislative Council was more or 
less a vent, to enable the few African representatives ventilate their grievances on a number of issues. 
Consistent with the colonial policy, the legislature, therefore, had very limited powers (Note 14). The 
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legislature during colonial rule was designed in such a way as to subordinate it to the executive branch. 
Martin Wight has strengthened this argument thus: 
A crown colony government is built on two great principles of subordination, namely, the 
legislature is subordinate to the Executive Council and the colonial government is 
subordinate to the imperial government (Note 15). 
For example, the Clifford Constitution circumscribed the powers of the Legislative Council with 
respect to powers of proposing ordinances and resolutions, instead the new constitution granted the 
power of initiating money resolution solely to the governor. Importantly, the legislators were denied the 
opportunity of voting collectively or individually against government’s proposals. Most of these 
colonial constitutions stretched the powers of the governor beyond limits at the detriment of the 
legislature. The reason for this type of centralization of powers was not far-fetched: the colonial 
administration was certainly unprepared for devolution or separation of powers because such an action 
would have been at variance with some of their policies that required firm and effective control of their 
colonies (Note 16). 
The story was not in any way different in subsequent years, particularly during military rule, as 
successive juntas further depleted the efficacy of the legislative institution. Prior to 1966, civilians who 
led the country respected the provisions of the constitution, especially by valuing the sanctity of the 
legislative institution. However, the military government that usurped power changed all that. In place 
of the constitution, the military ruled by decrees that contained extra-judicial clauses. In addition, 
through the Supreme Military Council (SMC), the military, led by the Head of State, appropriated the 
law-making power vested in the legislature. Consequently, the Supreme Military Council (SMC) 
emerged as the highest law and policy making body in the country. This contortion has remained one of 
the most painful features and legacies of military rule in Nigeria. The truncation of the activities of the 
legislature by the soldiers seriously contributed in weakening the legislative institution. 
Between 1966, when the military took over power in Nigeria, and 1999, when the military dictators 
transformed themselves into civilian rulers, a total of 291 decrees were promulgated that contained 
ouster clauses (Note 17). The entrenched military culture of over centralization of powers and blatant 
disregard for the rule of law, was inherited by the civilian administrations of 1979 and 1999. This 
culture of impunity introduced into Nigerian politics by the military and imbibed by civilians can be 
said to be the source of the weak political institutions inherent in the country. Due to the military hang 
over, successive civilian presidents have tended to behave as if all powers—including legislative 
powers—belong to the executive and in the process over stepping their constitutional boundaries. 
Abdullahi Mahdi terms this executive recklessness a recurring phrase in Nigeria’s political dictionary, 
which was first coined by Justice Kayode Eso, on account of the tendency for pervasive lawlessness 
beginning with the advent of military rule (Note 18). 
The over centralization of power in the Head of State heralded by the suspension of the 1963 
constitution reached its zenith under General Ibrahim Babangida. As the so-called military President, 
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he had a firm control over the commonwealth and resources of Nigeria, and with the support and 
loyalty of the Nigerian elites that could not survive outside of government patronage. He quickly 
emerged a tin god, awash with sycophants and praise singers (Note 19). Apart from the elite, a terrible 
culture in which everyone depended on the executive for patronage emerged.  
From the foregoing, it can be argued in a certain historical sense that two essential factors account for 
the weak legislative institution in the Fourth Republic. First, is the administrative policy of the colonial 
government to prevent the emergence of any viable legislature before 1960; the second factor is the 
authoritarian nature of military rule that was highly intolerant of any form of opposition or checks. The 
excessive concentration of power in the hands of the executive, for many years during colonial rule and 
under the various military regimes, created a penchant for an executive that prefers to dominate the 
other branches and institutions of government. 
 
4. Specific Challenges Confronting the Legislature in the Fourth Republic 
Arising from its weak foundation, the legislature, like many other institutions of state, has been 
confronted with several challenges since its re-introduction in 1999. These weaknesses have posed and 
are still posing serious challenges towards the attainment of inclusive political institutions that would 
translate to sustainable political development of the country. Some of these challenges are examined 
hereunder: 
In the first place, the legislature has been confronted with the challenge of independence. Since its 
re-introduction in 1999, the executive has overtly and consistently been interested in who leads both 
chambers of the National Assembly and state Assemblies. The executive contemplated the need to 
control the parliament early in the day by imposing their surrogates in the leadership. Such attempts 
created supremacy battles between the executive and the legislature and weakened the former’s 
cohesion. Isawa Elaigwu was more forthcoming on this issue: 
At the federal and state levels, the executive branch goes beyond mere interest, to impose 
pliant leadership on the legislature. At all tiers of government, pliant candidates were 
sponsored by the executive branch … in order to control the legislature (Note 20). 
There are several examples at the federal and state level to buttress this argument. For example, in 1999, 
the Obasanjo presidency worked assiduously, albeit successfully to impose the first senate president, 
Evans Enwerem and speaker of the House of Representatives, Salisu Buhari, to the chagrin of some 
legislators. This imposition created serious conflicts between the executive and the legislature. Sadly, 
this took place at a time that the nation would have been nurturing its democratic institutions after 
several years of military rule. As should be expected, these leaderships did not last neither did the 
subsequent ones. From 1999 to 2003, the senate produced three senate presidents, while the House of 
Representatives produced two speakers, albeit serious crises (Note 21). At the state level, newspapers 
were inundated with headlines, stories and editorials of state governors that had played invincible roles 
in the impeachment of their respective speakers using state resources and apparatus (Note 22). 
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Another major setback to the challenge of the institutionalization of the legislature is the complexity in 
the nature and character of the legislative bureaucracy. Thirteen years after the return of democratic 
governance in Nigeria, most legislative bureaucracies in the country are still tied to the apron-strings of 
the executive branch and this has distorted the growth of this institution and trampled on the principle 
of separation of powers, which the 1999 Nigerian Constitution as amended is anchored on. For instance, 
sections 51 and 96 of the 1999 Constitution as amended provide that the National Assembly and each 
state in the federation should establish an Assembly Service Commission. Unfortunately, only NASS 
and a very few states have been able to achieve this feet. In some states where this bill has been passed 
into law, such Commissions are yet to be established by the executive (Note 23).  
The establishment of state Assemblies Service Commission is very fundamental since the independence 
of the legislature cannot be discussed outside the framework of having an effective Assembly Service 
Commission. The Assembly Service Commission guarantees security of tenure for staff of the 
legislature and insulates them from the unwarranted postings of trained work force from the legislature 
to the executive, where the skills already acquired are not required. This practice has made it practically 
impossible for staff in the legislature to be fully professionalized and make a career within the 
legislative Bureaucracy. The vexed issue of the independence of the legislative bureaucracy has been a 
course of concern to the legislature. The continued appendage of the legislature to the executive arm of 
government in most states is a bane to the institutionalization of the legislative bureaucracy; it is also a 
decimal in our democratization process (Note 24). 
There is also the challenge of funding, or put differently, the financial autonomy of the legislature. The 
financial autonomy of the legislature requires that the funding of this branch of government should be 
placed on first line charge, to enable the legislature carry out its activities without let or hindrance. In 
this connection, the legislature would not have to depend on the executive arm for funding as has been 
the case in most states. The situation where the legislature depends entirely on the executive branch for 
the execution of its own programmes is not healthy for political institutionalization of this arm of 
government (Note 25). Attempts to amend the 1999 Constitution by the 6th Assembly to place State 
Assemblies on first-line charge was unsuccessful because the thirty six States Assemblies were unable 
to meet the two-third majority required to effect that amendment. The financial autonomy of the 
legislature is very critical because the quantity and quality of training of legislators and parliamentary 
staff can only be improved when the legislature is financially strengthened. 
In addition, the legislature in Nigeria is seriously facing perception challenges. Most members of the 
public are still yet to come to terms with the relevance of this arm of government. This negative 
perception arises from the credibility deficits that the federal and state legislators have continued to 
face. For instance, the legislature was constantly and frequently enmeshed in clannish, primordial and 
partisan interests. Their proclivity towards themselves, implicit in their greed, personal aggrandizement 
and self-centeredness has contributed to this negative public perception. There were also instances 
where the legislature engaged the executive in needless controversies. Unfortunately, most of its actions 
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were often reactive rather than proactive. The legislature, more often than not, failed to take the issue of 
its internal democracy and general constitutional responsibilities seriously, by putting itself on a moral 
high ground through the advancement of the ideas of transparency and accountability in the conduct of 
its activities. As it has been noted elsewhere: 
In the end, the public perception of the legislature was quite negative, as it saw this 
institution more as a liability or democratic deficit than an institution of government, 
constitutionally created to serve its interest. Granted that on some few occasions it took far 
reaching decisions that touched the lives of the people, but on a general note, it performed 
dismally (Note 26). 
Giving the enormous constitutional responsibilities vested on the legislature by the 1999 constitutions 
as amended, the general public expectation as regards how this arm of government should discharge 
this onerous responsibility is often very high. Apart from acting as checks on the executive branch, the 
legislature is expected to enact legislations and also educate the government on various government 
policies but this has hardly been the case. However, for the legislature to be able to rejig itself, it must 
evolve and develop a viable legislative culture and practice, especially on how to engage the executive 
branch without necessarily overheating the polity. Also there is need for debates in the legislature to 
transcend sectional and primordial interests (Note 27). The legislature must also learn how to advance 
the principles of transparency and accountability in the conduct of its affairs. Only then can it act as 
watchdogs to the executive, for it is imperative that those who go to equity should do so with clean 
hands. 
Further still, the legislature still faces the challenges of political institutionalization because of its 
inability to connect with the electorates. Since the return of democracy, most legislators disappear from 
their constituencies as soon as they are inaugurated. Most of them do not have constituency offices let 
alone organize constituency briefings to inform their constituents’ on proposed government policies, 
programmes and legislations (Note 28). Such meetings engender interactions between the legislators 
and his constituents and also provides an opportunity for the former to get feedbacks from the latter. 
Entrenched democracies consider legislator-constituency relations critical in institutionalizing the 
activities of parliament and also building public trust and confidence in their representatives. In the 
absence of such meetings, interactions and interface, the legislator and the legislative institution is 
perceived as a needless institution, established to waste tax payer’s resources.  
 
5. Conclusion: Towards Instutionalizing Parliaments in Nigeria 
The nature and character of political or economic institutions established in a country would ultimately 
determine the success or failure of that country. History is replete with several countries that failed 
because they established extractive political and economic institutions instead of inclusive ones. What 
this means is that the nature and quality of institutions, or perhaps, the politics of institutions are key to 
our understanding of the successes or failure of states. Since the return of democracy in Nigeria, the 
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country has been unable to develop solid, viable, strong and independent institutions that would drive 
the development process. Democracy does not necessarily translate to democratization and institution 
building. Whereas there is democracy in Nigeria, the institutions to drive the democratization process 
such as the legislature are weak and more or less extractive. This paper has shown that the Nigerian 
legislature faces fundamental challenges which has continued to hinder the successful 
institutionalization and sustenance of the democratic process. This is largely attributed to the nature and 
character of the type of institutions (especially the legislature) bequeathed to the country by the 
colonial administration and by successive regimes in the post-military era. Some of the challenges 
confronting the legislature which the paper dwelt extensively on are unnecessary interference in its 
activities by the executive branch, weak institutional capacity, lack of independence/autonomy 
(especially in the area funding), and the negative public perception of the institution, which has been 
created by the actors in the institution. 
For the legislature to become a more viable institution in the political and democratic process in 
Nigeria, it must necessarily have to rejig itself. First, it is important for legislators to recognize the 
powers vested in the by the 1999 constitution as amended and guard same jealously; second; it must 
develop and evolve a viable legislative culture and practice, especially on how to engage the executive 
branch with necessarily overheating the polity. In this connection, the legislature should learn to be 
more proactive (rather than being reactive) with the executive branch; thirdly, for the legislature to 
institutionalize itself and change the negative public perception, it would need to be more answerable to 
the people who elected them by inculcating the values of probity and accountability in the discharge of 
its duties; and lastly, legislators must regularly connect with their constituencies—such 
legislator/constituency relations would strengthen the bond between the former and the latter and 
would also go a long way in institutionalizing the legislature. 
 
References 
Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2013). Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and 
Poverty (Great Britain: Profile Books Ltd). 
Adejumobi, S. (2002). The Relevance of the Presidential System of Government to Nigeria’s Quest for 
Democracy. The Constitution: A Journal of Constitutional Development, 3(2). 
Akinbobola, A. (2002). Trends of Democratization in Africa: An Analysis of the Challenges of 
Political Instutionalization. Journal Constitutional Development, 3(2). 
Elaigwu, J. I. (2004). Democratic Governance and Political Instability in Nigeria. Benue State 
University Convocation Lecture. 
Huntington, S. (1991). The Third Wave: Democratization in Latin Twentieth Century. London: 
University of Oklahoma Press. 
Joseph, R. (1979). Democratization in Africa After 1989: Comparative and Theoretical perspectives. In 
Comparative Politics. London.  
www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape               Advances in Politics and Economic                      Vol. 1, No. 1, 2018 
41 
Published by SCHOLINK INC. 
Mahdi, A. (2004). We Can Actualize Our Dreams as a Nation, 6th Annual Public Lecture of the 
Ahmadu Bello University Alumni Association. Rivers State Branch, held on the 10th December. 
Ukase, P. I. (2007). The Role of the Military in Nigeria’s Democratization Process in the Fourth 
Republic. Benue Valley Journal of Humanities, 7(2).  
Ukase, P. I. (2010). Performance Evaluation of the Benue State Legislature, 1999-2007. Makurdi: 
Aboki Publishers. 
Ukase, P. I. (2012). Parliaments and the Challenges of Bureaucratic Institutionalization in Nigeria’s 
Fourth Republic. Paper delivered at the National Delegate Conference of the Parliamentary Staff 
Association of Nigeria (PASAN) held at Empire Suits, Makurdi on 25th April. 
Ukase, P. I. (2012). Presidential System and Executive Recklessness in Post-Military Nigerian Politics: 
Implications for Inter-Branch Relationship. In W. Bokelmann, O. Akinwumi, U. M. Nwankwo, & 
A.O. Agwuele (Eds.), African Leadership Challenges and other Issues. Belin-Germany: 
Mediateam IT Educational Publishers. 
Ukase, P. I. (2012). The Nigerian Legislature in Historical Perspective: Challenges and Prospects, 
1960-2010. In O. Akinwumi, M. M. Adamu, & P. Ukase (Eds.), Nigeria at 50: The Challenges of 
Nation Building. Zaria: ABU Press. A Publication of the Historical Society of Nigeria. 
Ukase, P. I. (2014). A History of Executive-Legislative Relations in Nigeria, 1914-2007 (Ibadan: 
University Press). 
Ukase, P. I. (2014). Performance Appraisal of Margaret Icheen’s Leadership of the Benue State 
Legislature, 1999-2002. Veritas Journal of Gender and Women Studies, 1(1). 
Ukase, P. I. (2016). Followership Deficit and Its Implications for Democratic Governance in Nigeria’s 
Fourth Republic. In C. C. Osakwe (Ed.), Leadership and Complex Military Operations. Kaduna: 
Nigerian Defence Academy.  
Uwechue, R. (1999). Africa Today. London. 
Wight, M. (1952). British Colonial Administrations. Oxford University Press. 
 
Notes 
Note 1. For more details of this factors, read P. I. Ukase, A History of Executive-Legislative Relations 
in Nigeria, 1914-2007 (Ibadan: University Press), 2014 and P. I. Ukase, “Presidential System and 
Executive Recklessness in Post-Military Nigerian Politics: Implications for Inter-Branch Relationship”. 
In W. Bokelmann, O. Akinwumi, U. M. Nwankwo, & A. O. Agwuele (Eds.), African Leadership 
Challenges and other Issues (Belin-Germany: Mediateam IT Educational Publishers, 2012). 
Note 2. Adejumobi, S. (December, 2002). The Relevance of the Presidential System of Government to 
Nigeria’s Quest for Democracy. In The Constitution: A Journal of Constitutional Development, 3(2). 
Note 3. Akinbobola, A. (2012). Trends of Democratization in Africa: An Analysis of the Challenges of 
Political Instutionalization. In Journal Constitutional Development, 3(2), 1. This position is also echoed 
by R. Joseph, Democratization in Africa After 1989: Comparative and Theoretical perspectives. In 
www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape               Advances in Politics and Economic                      Vol. 1, No. 1, 2018 
42 
Published by SCHOLINK INC. 
Comparative Politics London (pp. 363-382); and Huntington, S. (1991). The Third Wave: 
Democratization in Latin Twentieth Century (London: University of Oklahoma Press), 1991, p. 105. 
Note 4. Ukase, P. I. (2010). Performance Evaluation of the Benue State Legislature, 1999-2007 
(Makurdi: Aboki Publishers), p. xviii. 
Note 5. See Ukase, P. I. (2010). The Nigerian Legislature in Historical Perspective: Challenges and 
Prospects, 1960-2010. In O. Akinwumi, M. M. Adamu, & P. Ukase (Eds.), Nigeria at 50: The 
Challenges of Nation Building (Zaria: ABU Press), A Publication of the Historical Society of Nigeria, 
2012. 
Note 6. See Adejumobi, S. “The Relevance of the Presidential System of Government to Nigeria’s 
Quest for Democracy”, p. 50 and P. I. Ukase, A History of Executive-Legislative Relations in 
Nigeria…” p. 50. 
Note 7. For more details on democracy read P. I. Ukase, “Followership Deficit and Its Implications for 
Democratic Governance in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic”. In C. C. Osakwe (Ed.), Leadership and 
Complex Military Operations (Kaduna: Nigerian Defence Academy), 2016, pp. 39-40. 
Note 8. P. I. Ukase, “The Role of the Military in Nigeria’s Democratization Process in the Fourth 
Republic”, Benue Valley Journal of Humanities, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2007, p. 32. 
Note 9. Also see P. I. Ukase, “The Role of the Military in Nigeria’s Democratization Process”, p. 32. 
Note 10. A. Akinbobola, “Trends of Democratization in Africa…,” p. 3.  
Note 11. For more elaborate details on this perspective see D. Acemoglu and J. A. Robinson, Why 
Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty (Great Britain: Profile Books Ltd), 2013. 
Note 12. D. Acemoglu and J.A. Robinson, Why Nations Fail…,” pp. 79-80.  
Note 13. P. I. Ukase, “The Nigerian Legislature in Historical Perspective…,” p. 35.  
Note 14. See M. Wight, British Colonial Administrations (Oxford University Press), 1952, p. 17. 
Note 15. M. Wight, British Colonial Administrations. 
Note 16. R. Uwechue (Ed.), Africa Today (London), 1999, p. 1457. 
Note 17. P. I. Ukase, A History of Executive-Legislative Relations in Nigeria…, p. 107. 
Note 18. A. Mahdi, “We Can Actualize Our Dreams as a Nation”, 6th Annual Public Lecture of the 
Ahmadu Bello University Alumni Association, Rivers State Branch, held on the 10th December, 2004, 
p. 21. 
Note 19. A. Mahdi, “We Can Actualize Our Dreams as a Nation,” p. 21.  
Note 20. See J. I. Elaigwu, “Democratic Governance and Political Instability in Nigeria,” Benue State 
University Convocation Lecture, 2004, p. 127. 
Note 21. For more details on these conflicts read P. I. Ukase, A History of Executive-Legislative 
Relations in Nigeria… 
Note 22. Details of these conflicts can be read in P. I. Ukase, “Performance Appraisal of Margaret 
Icheen’s Leadership of the Benue State Legislature, 1999-2002”, Veritas Journal of Gender and 
Women Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2014. 
www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ape               Advances in Politics and Economic                      Vol. 1, No. 1, 2018 
43 
Published by SCHOLINK INC. 
Note 23. P. I. Ukase, “Parliaments and the Challenges of Bureaucratic Institutionalization in Nigeria’s 
Fourth Republic”, Paper delivered at the National Delegate Conference of the Parliamentary Staff 
Association of Nigeria (PASAN) held at Empire Suits, Makurdi on 25th April, 2012, pp. 5-7. 
Note 24. P. I. Ukase, “Parliaments and the Challenges of Bureaucratic Institutionalization...,” p. 6. 
Note 25. P. I. Ukase, “Parliaments and the Challenges of Bureaucratic Institutionalization...,” p. 11. 
Note 26. P. I. Ukase, Performance Evaluation of the Benue State Legislature, 1999-2007, p. 79.  
Note 27. P. I. Ukase, Performance Evaluation of the Benue State Legislature, 1999-2007, p. 80. 
Note 28. P. I. Ukase, Performance Evaluation of the Benue State Legislature, 1999-2007, p. 80-81. 
 
 
